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October 14, 195[illegible]

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CONANT:

I saw the French Deputy High Commissioner, M. Berard, this morning. He expressed the opinion that the French Parliament would not move to consider the EDC Treaty unless there had been prior agreement between France and the Federal Republic on at least the principles of a Saar settlement. He thought such an agreement would not be satisfactory to the French if it were couched in general terms. Specific subjects, notably in the political, economic, and financial fields, would have to be dealt with fairly fully, although not in detail, since the technical experts could later attend to spelling out what their principals had in mind. Berard urged me, if possible, to discuss with the Chancellor his plan for new elections in the Saar. The Chancellor was said at one time to have considered such new elections a pre-requisite to consideration by his Government of a Saar settlement. This would be impossible for the French to accept since it would be tantamount to their admitting that the last elections had not been fairly or even honestly conducted. I told Berard that perhaps a formula could be found whereby new elections would take place as a result of the changes which would be made necessary in the Saar Constitution, if an agreement between France and the Federal Republic on this subject were reached.

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At 11:30 a.m. I went to see Hallstein. Blankenhorn came in shortly thereafter. Hallstein said the Chancellor was very much opposed to two features of the projected note to Russia about a Four-Ministers' Conference. (1) He did not like the possibility of opening up a discussion on "all aspects" of the question. (2) He is very opposed to any discussion whatever, even unilaterally, by the Russians of the so-called security safeguards. In reply I said I was without any competence to give an opinion in regard to the note. It did not lie in any respect within the field of my responsibilities. He then took up independently the matter of security safeguards and I told him that in my personal opinion the Van Zeeland plan as presently drawn was extremely dangerous, especially because of the feature calling for the stationing of only EDC troops in Western Germany. Van Zeeland expects shortly to visit Bonn and bring his plan personally to the Chancellor's attention.

Hallstein next asked me if I knew why the three Foreign Ministers were meeting in London. I told him I had no information on the subject beyond the fact that Mr. Dulles was coming with a staff of only two persons and I had no information that any questions affecting Germany would be before the Foreign Ministers for contemplation. I assumed that one of the topics might be Yugoslavia but this assumption was entirely gratuitous on my part.

Hallstein then moved on to the question of the recent conference in Rome. He thought that some progress had been made. The Federal

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Republic Government had been in favor of the Dutch desire to postpone the Foreign Ministers' Conference at The Hague on ERP from October 22 to the date now fixed - November 26. They believed the interval could be usefully employed in preliminary explorations of how to reconcile points of differences between the delegations that had emerged during the conference so that the Foreign Ministers would have less difficulty in making decisions on November 26. I told him of Beyen's intention to visit his fellow-Ministers and engage with them in informal diplomatic contacts on this subject. Hallstein thought this might be useful and stated the secretary of the Foreign Ministers, Kalmus, would probably be instructed to draw up a questionnaire that would set forth very simply the existing disagreements and ask each Foreign Minister to indicate his Government's opinion in connection with them.

We talked over the desirability of having the Foreign Ministers, after the November 26 gathering, name members of national delegations who would address themselves continuously to trying to perfect a final draft Constitution. He was favorably inclined to this idea. We agreed that Monnet would be an admirable chairman for such a committee but he doubted it would be possible to name him. At any rate this could only be done on French initiative.

I told Hallstein that we were strongly in favor of holding out for a strong and independent supranational executive appointed by and responsible to the European Parliament. This is necessary not only for its own sake but also to satisfy Mollet, one of whose essential demands is that the EPC Executive have real control from the beginning over the European

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army. Hallstein felt this would be difficult to accomplish in the terms I had stated it but that Teitgen had a formula whereby the Executive might be nominated by the Council of Ministers but approved by the popular branch of the European Parliament.

I told Hallstein what I had learned in Holland about the Dutch stand on the establishment of a common market. I suggested that Mansholt might be in a position to engineer a compromise. I also outlined what form such a compromise might take, namely giving the supranational Executive and the popular branch of the European Parliament, acting together, the right and duty to make proposals for extensions of competence in the economic field for presentation to the six national Parliaments, such proposals not to be subject to a single nation veto in the Council of National Ministers.

After an hour and a half with Hallstein and Blankenhorn we went in to talk to the Chancellor. He said he was very encouraged by the way progress had been made this morning on the formation of his Cabinet. It had been an arduous task but it was now completed and he expected to have his final slate approved on Tuesday of next week. After that he would be free to devote himself to other affairs. He questioned me regarding the three Foreign Ministers' meeting in London and the reply to the Russian note. I gave him substantially the same answers as I had to Hallstein. We then embarked on the Saar question. He said Bidault had made no recent approaches to him and seemed somewhat surprised that the French Government expected him to take an initiative

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with Bidault. It was his understanding that Francois-Poncet had been entrusted by Bidault with the charge of trying to work out the preliminaries of a solution with the Chancellor. Francois-Poncet was returning here Friday and he hoped to follow up the matter with him at an early date, although he doubted they would have serious talks until the last week of this month. After that, depending on how the discussions with Francois-Poncet went, he would be prepared to deal, if it then seemed advisable, directly with Bidault. He said he was inclined to confirm what he thought was his understanding by a letter to Bidault announcing that he, the Chancellor, would pursue the subject with Francois-Poncet at the earliest opportunity and would expect to follow it up with Bidault later on.

He acknowledged some confusion as to how to handle the Saar problem with the French Government since there seemed to be three elements involved: (1) Bidault as Foreign Minister; (2) Quai d'Orsay; (3) the French Cabinet as a whole. I advocated his reducing to concrete form a German proposal on the solution or else handling it on the basis of the Council of Europe report. He said he would prefer the former and that no doubt they would be able to isolate the points of difference during his conferences with Francois-Poncet.

I said that our Government was anxious to accelerate a disposition of the Saar problem, if that were possible. I added that we had never been willing to accept the French thesis that such a settlement would be a prerequisite to consideration of the EDC by the French Parliament

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but that as a matter of practical politics such seemed to be the situation faced in th, light of the French domestic political climate. The Chancellor answered that he was anxious to proceed as rapidly as possible but that the French as far as he knew seemed to be in no hurry nor had he been in a position until he had completed the formation of his Cabinet to devote his own time to it. He would now press forward as rapidly as circumstances permitted but believed it improbable, from what he had heard of the confusion in French political circles, that a definite decision would be reached until after the French presidential elections took place.

Red Dowling joined us for lunch, which was also attended by Messrs. Hallstein, Blankenhorn, and the Chancellor's interpreter. Afterwards we talked for another hour more or less recapitulating the remarks made in our conversations of the morning. I gave a resume of the EDC ratification prospects in each country. The Chancellor indicated entire confidence in his ability to have the Treaty signed in Germany regardless of the Court since he would have a majority in favor of amending the Constitution by 2/3rds in each House of Parliament. He thought the time opportune for the U. S. Government to ask Pella to proceed with the ratification process in the Italian Parliament. He thought that when France became isolated by preliminary action in at least one of the Chambers of the other participating countries, even excluding Italy, it would have to ratify.

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As HICOG has reported in other connections, the Chancellor and Hallstein both explained to me today that the Chancellor was far from being a free agent in dealing with the Saar problem. Although his majority is safe in most other respects, on this one he must consult not only with the members of his own Cabinet but with leaders of the various parties in Parliament. It should not, therefore, be assumed that the Chancellor is completely independent in regard to this question.

David K. E. Bruce

P.S. I expressed in strong terms my conviction that new elections in the Saar, prior to a Franco-German agreement on a settlement, would be totally unacceptable to the French and that the Chancellor should drop the idea. He said he would give this serious consideration.

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